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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
For many years Cambria County, a political 
subdivision of Pennsylvania, owned and operated Laurel 
Crest Nursing and Rehabilitation Center (―Laurel Crest‖).  As 
a state-owned facility, labor relations at Laurel Crest were 
subject to Pennsylvania labor law.  In January 2010, however, 
Grane Healthcare Co. (―Grane‖) bought Laurel Crest, and 
established a new entity, Cambria Care Center (―Cambria 
Care‖), to serve as its operator.1  Because Grane and Cambria 
Care (collectively, the ―Company‖) are private employers, 
labor relations at the facility became subject to the National 
Labor Relations Act (the ―NLRA‖ or ―Act‖), 29 U.S.C. § 151 
et seq.   
The Act‘s preamble expressly states Congress‘s 
purpose in enacting a federal labor law.   
It is hereby declared to be the 
policy of the United States to 
eliminate the causes of certain 
                                              
1
 Cambria Care is the fictitious business name of Ebensburg 
Care Center LLC. 
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substantial obstructions to the free 
flow of commerce and to mitigate 
and eliminate these obstructions 
when they have occurred by 
encouraging the practice and 
procedure of collective bargaining 
and by protecting the exercise by 
workers of full freedom of 
association, self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of 
their own choosing, for the 
purpose of negotiating the terms 
and conditions of their 
employment or other mutual aid 
or protection. 
Id. § 151.  In service of these objectives, Congress included in 
the NLRA a number of substantive provisions prohibiting 
certain labor and management practices.  Among other things, 
the Act prohibits employers from refusing to bargain 
collectively with their employees‘ representatives, id. 
§ 158(a)(3), and from not hiring applicants based on their 
union membership or activity, id. § 158(a)(5).  
This case arises from a decision and order of the 
National Labor Relations Board (the ―Board‖) concluding 
that the Company, in connection with its takeover of Laurel 
Crest, violated these provisions.  The Company has petitioned 
us for review, and the Board has cross-petitioned us for 
enforcement, of this decision and order.  For reasons to be 
discussed, we deny the Company‘s petition for review and 
grant the Board‘s cross-petition for enforcement.2 
                                              
2
 The Board had jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 29 
U.S.C. § 160(a).  We have jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. 
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I.  Background 
As noted, Laurel Crest‘s workforce was employed by 
Cambria County, a public employer subject to Pennsylvania‘s 
Public Employee Relations Act (the ―PERA‖), 43 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 1101 et seq.  Laurel Crest had two unions—one for 
nonprofessional employees and one for nurses—certified 
under the PERA.  In 1971, the Pennsylvania Labor Relations 
Board (the ―PLRB‖) certified Local Union No. 1305 (―Local 
1305‖) as the exclusive union representative of nursing aides, 
housekeepers, and other nonprofessional employees at Laurel 
Crest after that unit of employees elected Local 1305 to 
represent it.  Fifteen years later, in 1986, the PLRB certified 
the predecessor to the Service Employees International Union 
(for convenience, the current union and its predecessor are 
referred to as the ―SEIU‖) as the exclusive union 
representative of nursing employees at Laurel Crest after that 
unit of employees elected representation by the SEIU.  
Following certification, Cambria County recognized each 
union as the representative of its respective employee unit, 
and continued to do so throughout its ownership of the 
facility. 
When Grane, which owns multiple nursing facilities 
across Pennsylvania, attempted to purchase Laurel Crest on 
two separate occasions—unsuccessfully in 2003 and then 
successfully in 2009—the unions were by and large against 
Grane taking over.  In 2003, both unions publicly opposed the 
sale and filed legal action intended to stop it.  In 2009, Local 
1305 again opposed the sale outright, and publicly took that 
position, while the SEIU, though less absolute, engaged in a 
                                                                                                     
§§ 160(e) and (f) to hear both the Company‘s petition for 
review and the Board‘s cross-petition for enforcement.  
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series of rallies to raise awareness about concerns it had with 
the sale.  
Despite the opposition and expressions of concern, in 
September 2009 Cambria County entered into an asset 
purchase agreement with Grane.  Following its execution, 
Grane implemented transfer of the facility to Cambria Care.  
That transfer was officially completed on January 1, 2010, 
and the facility became known as Cambria Care.  During that 
acquisition period, from September 2009 through December 
2009, Grane was responsible for all decisions relating to the 
facility‘s operations, including its initial staffing.  Leonard 
Oddo, a Grane Vice President, interviewed and hired the top 
administrator at Cambria Care, Owen Larkin.  And, even after 
hiring Larkin, Oddo and other Grane representatives 
remained in charge of hiring Cambria Care‘s workforce.   
A variety of labor-related decisions relevant to this 
petition were made around this time.  Prior to the 
consummation of the transfer, most Laurel Crest employees 
applied to work at Cambria Care, and the vast majority of 
those applicants were hired.  Grane, however, did not hire 
four of the five Local 1305 officers who applied for positions.  
It also refused to hire an SEIU-represented employee who had 
participated in SEIU‘s public activities relating to the sale.  In 
addition, Local 1305 and the SEIU each requested that Grane 
and Cambria Care recognize it as the exclusive bargaining 
representative of its unit of employees.  Both Grane and 
Cambria Care refused to recognize or bargain with the 
unions, and continued to do so until the time the Board issued 
its decision and order. 
Though Cambria Care became the facility‘s operator in 
January 2010, Grane retained control over aspects of its 
operations.  Importantly, during the acquisition period Grane 
and Cambria Care entered into a management agreement 
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designating Grane as the manager of the facility and Cambria 
Care as its operator.  The agreement—which was executed by 
two individuals who were simultaneously officers for both 
Grane and Cambria Care—was adopted without negotiation 
and has not since been altered.  Per that agreement, Grane‘s 
employees maintained a significant, ongoing presence at the 
facility, and continued to manage significant facets of the 
facility‘s operations.   
This close relationship between the companies was 
also preserved by their ownership structure.  Grane owns a 
controlling stake, 99.5%, of Cambria Care, and the overlap of 
the companies‘ officers is near complete.  In addition, while 
Larkin is nominally in charge of Cambria Care, he continues 
to report to and can be terminated by Oddo.  Indeed, a 
healthcare license application filed with Pennsylvania on 
Cambria Care‘s behalf attests that all of the nursing facilities 
owned by Grane in Pennsylvania are under ―common 
management, ownership, and/or control.‖   
Shortly after Grane and Cambria Care took over of the 
facility, Local 1305 and the SEIU filed unfair labor practice 
charges against Grane and Cambria Care.  Following its 
investigation, the Board‘s General Counsel issued a 
complaint alleging that Grane and Cambria Care were jointly 
and severally liable for failing to recognize and bargain with 
the unions in violation of NLRA § 8(a)(5) and refusing to hire 
the four Local 1305 officers and one SEIU-represented 
employee on the basis of their union membership or activities 
in violation of NLRA § 8(a)(3). 
After a six-day hearing, an administrative law judge 
(―ALJ‖) issued a decision in this matter making the following 
findings: (1) Grane and Cambria Care were a single employer 
subject to the Act, and thus jointly and severally liable for 
remedying unfair labor practices committed by either of 
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them; (2) the Company, as a single employer, violated the Act 
by failing to recognize and bargain with Local 1305, though 
not by refusing to recognize and bargain with the SEIU;
3
 and 
(3) the Company, as a single employer, violated the Act by 
not hiring the five employees due to antiunion animus.  The 
Board affirmed the ALJ‘s findings, adopted its decision, and 
issued an order requiring the Company, among other things, 
to recognize and bargain with Local 1305 and hire the five 
employees to the positions for which they had applied. 
II.  Standard of Review 
We afford considerable deference to the Board.  The 
Supreme Court has ―emphasized often that the [Board] has 
the primary responsibility for developing and applying 
national labor policy.‖  NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, 
Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990).  ―We will [therefore] uphold a 
Board rule as long as it is rational and consistent with the Act, 
even if we would have formulated a different rule had we sat 
on the Board.‖  Id. at 787 (citations omitted).  ―Moreover, if 
the Board‘s application of such a rational rule is supported by 
substantial evidence on the record,‖ we will ―enforce the 
Board‘s order.‖  Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. 
                                              
3
 The ALJ determined that the Company did not violate the 
Act by failing to recognize and bargain with the SEIU 
because that union only was elected to meet with 
management to discuss employment issues on behalf of 
Laurel Crest nursing employees and not to bargain 
collectively on their behalf.  See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (defining 
employee representatives as those selected by a majority of 
employees ―for the purposes of collective bargaining‖).  This 
aspect of the ALJ‘s Board-adopted decision is not challenged 
here. 
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NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42 (1987); see also NLRB v. Scott 
Printing Corp., 612 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1979); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 160(e).  In particular, we defer to the Board‘s credibility 
determinations, and will reverse them only if they are 
―‗inherently incredible or patently unreasonable.‘‖  St. 
George Warehouse, Inc. v. NLRB, 420 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 
2005) (quoting Atlantic Limousine, Inc. v. NLRB, 243 F.3d 
711, 718–19 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
III.  Discussion 
The Company raises three challenges to the Board‘s 
decision and order in its petition.   
(1)  Substantial evidence does not support that Grane 
and Cambria Care are a single employer. 
(2)  Use of the successorship doctrine to find that the 
Company had a duty to bargain with Local 1305 is contrary to 
the terms of the Act. 
(3)  Substantial evidence does not support that the 
Company violated the Act by not hiring the five Laurel Crest 
employees. 
A. Single Employer Status 
The Act prohibits covered employers, as that term is 
defined by the NLRA, from committing unfair labor practices 
such as refusing to bargain with their employees‘ 
representatives or not hiring an applicant based on his union 
membership or activities.  29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 158(a).  ―The 
single employer doctrine is a creation of the Board which 
allows it to treat two or more related enterprises as one 
employer within the meaning of the [Act].‖  Carpenters Local 
Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 504 
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(5th Cir. 1982).  When the Board finds that two nominally 
separate entities are a single employer, they are jointly and 
severally liable for remedying unfair labor practices 
committed by either of them.  NLRB v. Browning-Ferris 
Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982); NLRB 
v. Emsing’s Supermarket, Inc., 872 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir. 
1989).   
―Single employer status ultimately depends on all the 
circumstances of the case and is characterized as an absence 
of an arm‘s length relationship found among unintegrated 
companies.‖  Browning-Ferris, 691 F.2d at 1122 (quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  The Board considers four 
factors in determining whether separate entities are a single 
employer: ―(1) functional integration of operations; (2) 
centralized control of labor relations; (3) common 
management; and (4) common ownership.‖  Id.  No one 
factor is controlling, although the first three factors, 
particularly centralized control over labor relations, are 
generally considered more compelling that the fourth.  NLRB 
v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 551 (3d Cir. 1983).   
The Company asks that we reverse the Board‘s 
determination that Grane and Cambria Care are a single 
employer.  It does not challenge the Board‘s finding that 
Grane controlled operations at the facility during the 
acquisition period from September 2009 until December 
2009, or that Grane and Cambria Care continued to have 
common ownership, common management, and interrelated 
operations following transfer of the facility into Cambria 
Care‘s hands in January 2010.  Nonetheless, it argues that we 
must reverse the Board‘s ruling because the evidence in the 
record demonstrates that Grane did not control labor relations 
at the facility—arguably the most critical factor, Mercy Hosp. 
of Buffalo, 336 N.L.R.B. 1282, 1284 (2001)—from the day 
that the transfer occurred.  We disagree.
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Our biggest concern with the Company‘s argument is 
that it is based on discredited testimony.  Owen Larkin—who, 
as noted, was Cambria Care‘s top administrator—testified 
that he, and not Grane, controlled day-to-day operations at the 
facility after the transfer.  The Board found this testimony 
self-serving and overwhelmed by other evidence in the 
record.  In particular, it found that Larkin‘s lack of knowledge 
about much of the facility‘s operations—including important 
aspects of the facility‘s financial dealings—undermined his 
claim that he was in charge.  The Board found it more likely 
that Oddo, the Grane Vice President to whom Larkin 
reported, actually made many, if not most, of the important 
decisions at the facility. 
We also do not deem as irrelevant evidence of Grane‘s 
control during the acquisition period.  Prior to the transfer 
date, Grane made every important decision relating to 
establishing operations at the facility.  This included hiring 
Cambria Care‘s workforce, determining initial salaries and 
benefits, and putting in place a variety of other employment-
related policies, all of which continue to affect employees at 
the facility.  In fact, the no-hire decisions that are at issue in 
this appeal were made by Grane representatives supervised by 
Oddo during the period of acquisition.     
There is, moreover, substantial evidence in the record 
that Grane continued to control operations at Cambria Care 
after the transfer date.  As the ALJ explained, 
Grane did not get Cambria Care 
up and running and then walk 
away, leaving Cambria Care as an 
independently functioning 
operation that would succeed or 
fail on its own.  To the contrary, 
to begin with, Grane and Cambria 
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Care continue to have, as [the 
Company] concedes[,] common 
ownership and common 
management at the executive 
level, two factors the Board looks 
to in determining single employer 
analysis.  But more than that, the 
potential control of Cambria Care 
that is a function of Grane‘s 
common ownership and common 
upper management with Cambria 
Care is actualized every day by 
the ubiquitous presence of Grane 
personnel in the affairs of 
Cambria Care—a state of affairs 
deliberately established by Grane 
when it set up Cambria Care‘s 
operations in the fall and winter of 
2009.   
Grane Healthcare Co., 357 NLRB No. 123, 2011 WL 
6002197, at *52 (Nov. 30, 2011) (citation omitted).  During 
the acquisition period, when Grane‘s control was complete, it 
took specific actions—including, as noted, putting in place 
the management agreement between Grane and Cambria 
Care—to ensure its influence would continue after the 
transfer date.   
The Board‘s determination that Grane and Cambria 
Care are a single employer was based on detailed factual 
findings relating to each of the four factors normally 
considered to determine that status.  Though we do not 
exhaustively recite those findings here, they describe two 
deeply integrated companies with centralized control 
emanating from Grane.  We are not persuaded by the 
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Company‘s contention that the Board‘s single-employer 
decision fails the substantial evidence test. 
B. Duty to Bargain 
The Board concluded that the Company, as a single 
employer, violated § 8(a)(5) of the Act by failing to recognize 
and bargain with Local 1305.  That section makes it ―an 
unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain 
collectively with the representatives of his employees.‖  29 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).  In order to be an employee representative 
entitled to bargain with an employer, a union or other entity 
must have the support of a majority of a properly defined unit 
of employees.
4
  Id. § 159(a).  To promote stability, the Board 
has created a number of doctrines whereby majority support 
is presumed to exist.
5
   
The Company challenges the Board‘s use of one of 
these doctrines, successorship, to find that it had a duty to 
                                              
4
 Majority support is generally established ―by one of two 
methods:  [1] [Board] certification pursuant to an election or 
[2] voluntary recognition of the union by the employer.‖  
Lincoln Park Zoological Soc’y v. NLRB, 116 F.3d 216, 219 
(7th Cir. 1997) (citing Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d 
1243, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1994); NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, 
Inc., 647 F.2d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 1981)).  
 
5
 For example, there is an irrebuttable presumption of 
majority support during both the first year after certification 
and the first three years of a collective-bargaining agreement.  
Levitz Furniture Co., 333 N.L.R.B. 717, 720 n.17 (2001).  At 
other times, that presumption is rebuttable by proof of loss of 
majority support.  Id. at 720. 
14 
 
bargain with Local 1305.  Broadly speaking, under this 
doctrine ―[a] new employer has a duty . . . to bargain with the 
incumbent union that represented the predecessor‘s 
employees when there is a ‗substantial continuity‘ between 
the predecessor and successor enterprises.‖  Chester ex rel. 
NLRB v. Grane Healthcare Co., 666 F.3d 87, 100 (3d Cir. 
2011) (quoting Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43).   The Company 
does not contest the presence of the requisite substantial 
continuity, which is a fact-intensive inquiry.  Instead, it 
argues that, as a matter of law, the successorship doctrine 
cannot be applied where the predecessor employer is a state 
(or political subdivision thereof) not subject to the Act.  
According to the Company, because Cambria County did not 
have a legal obligation under the NLRA to bargain with Local 
1305 when it controlled the facility, the Company could not 
inherit that obligation when it took control of the facility. 
The Company misapprehends the issue.  It is 
indisputable that Cambria County, as a political subdivision 
of Pennsylvania, was not covered by the NLRA.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 152(2).  Whether it was subject to the Act when it operated 
the facility, however, is not determinative.  The Company is 
not being held liable for violations of the Act committed by 
Cambria County.  It is being held liable for its refusal to 
recognize and bargain with Local 1305.   
The imposition of this latter liability is permissible 
provided the majority support Local 1305 established under 
Pennsylvania law could, consistent with the NLRA, establish 
a presumption of majority support under federal law.  In that 
respect, there is nothing in the Act precluding the Board from 
finding—as it did—that certification under Pennsylvania law 
is sufficient.  The Act provides that an employer must bargain 
with a representative selected by a majority of employees to 
do so on their behalf.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), 159(a).  It is 
15 
 
silent, however, on the ways in which that majority support 
can be established. 
While there may be instances where the process of 
establishing majority support under state law is so unreliable 
that the Board‘s application of the successorship doctrine 
would be irrational, this is not so here.
6
  To the contrary, there 
is significant support for the Board‘s determination that 
certification under the PERA provides substantially similar 
protections for employers and employees as Board 
certification under federal law.
   
  Both federal and 
Pennsylvania law, for example, allow majority support to be 
                                              
6
 The Company also argues that application of the 
successorship doctrine is inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court‘s decision in Linden Lumber Div, Summer & Co. v. 
NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).  In that case, the Court upheld 
the Board‘s determination that an employer is not legally 
bound to recognize a union seeking initial representation on 
the basis of authorization cards purporting to show majority 
support.  Id. at 309–10.  According to the Company, Linden 
stands for the proposition that when ―an employer is 
presented with an initial demand for recognition by a labor 
organization, it has a right to have the issue determined in a 
Board election.‖  Appellants Br. at 14.  We disagree.  The 
Court in Linden did not decide in the first instance what 
procedures could be used to establish majority support, but 
whether the Board abused its discretion in determining that 
authorization cards could not be used.  The Company has not 
explained, and we do not see any reason, why it is irrational 
for the Board to conclude that voting by authorization cards 
was not reliable to establish majority support but certification 
pursuant to Pennsylvania law was reliable. 
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established by board certification following an election, 
compare Lincoln Park, 116 F.3d at 219 with 43 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 1101.605, and allow for the filing of decertification 
provisions in appropriate instances, compare 29 U.S.C. 
159(e) with 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1101.607.  Indeed, due to 
similarities between the laws, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court often looks to the NLRA in interpreting the PERA.  See 
Commonwealth of Pa. Office of Admin. v. PLRB., 916 A.2d 
541, 550 (Pa. 2007).
7
 
The purpose of the successorship doctrine is to 
encourage stability at a time of transition.  As the Supreme 
Court explained in approving the Board‘s creation of the 
successorship doctrine, 
[d]uring a transition between 
employers, a union is in a 
peculiarly vulnerable position.  It 
has no formal and established 
bargaining relationship with the 
new employer, is uncertain about 
the new employer‘s plans, and 
cannot be sure if or when the new 
employer must bargain with it.  
While being concerned with the 
                                              
7
 There is also no indication that Cambria County doubted 
Local 1305 was an appropriate bargaining counterparty at any 
time during its ownership of the facility.  Following its 
certification under Pennsylvania law, Local 1305 entered into 
a series of collective-bargaining agreements with Cambria 
County, the most recent of which expired in December 2008.  
The parties attempted to negotiate a successor agreement but 
were unsuccessful. 
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future of its members with the 
new employer, the union also 
must protect whatever rights still 
exist for its members under the 
collective-bargaining agreement 
with the predecessor employer.  
Accordingly, during this 
unsettling transition period, the 
union needs the presumptions of 
majority status to which it is 
entitled to safeguard its members‘ 
rights and to develop a 
relationship with the successor. 
Fall River, 482 U.S. at 39 (footnote omitted).  We see no 
reason why the Board‘s determination that this policy applies 
equally to a public-to-private transition is irrational or 
inconsistent with the Act.  We therefore join other Courts of 
Appeals in approving the application of the successorship 
doctrine in this context.  See Cmt’y Hosps. of Cent. Cal. v. 
NLRB, 335 F.3d 1079, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Lincoln Park, 
116 F.3d at 218–20. 
C. Refusal to Hire 
The Board also concluded that the Company, as a 
single employer, engaged in an unfair labor practice by 
refusing to hire the five former Laurel Crest employees.  
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act provides in pertinent part that it is 
―an unfair labor practice for an employer[,] . . . by 
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment[,] 
. . . to encourage or discourage membership in any labor 
organization.‖  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).  As we have previously 
explained, 
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[t]he employer‘s motivation in 
[refusing to hire] the employee is 
essential to finding a violation [of 
this section], and the Board may 
look to both direct and 
circumstantial evidence to 
determine whether an unlawful 
motive exists.  Relevant factors 
include whether the employer 
knew about the employee‘s union 
activity; whether the employer 
was hostile towards the union; the 
timing of the employee‘s [no-hire 
decision]; and the employer‘s 
reasons (or lack thereof) for 
[refusing to hire] the employee.  
NLRB v. Omnitest Inspection Servs., Inc., 937 F.2d 112, 122 
(3d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).  The Board found that the 
Company‘s refusal to hire was motivated by the requisite 
antiunion animus.  That inference was primarily supported by 
findings that (a) there was a gross disproportion between the 
percentage of Local 1305 officers hired (20 percent) and the 
percentage of other former employees hired (80 percent), and 
(b) the Company‘s justifications for not hiring the five 
employees were mere pretext. 
The Company argues that the determination by the 
Board that the Company violated § 8(a)(3) should be reversed 
because the Board‘s finding that the Company‘s justifications 
were mere pretext is not supported by substantial evidence.
8
  
                                              
8
 The Company also argues that the Board‘s determination 
that the Grane representatives who made the no-hire decisions 
knew of the employees‘ union activities was not supported by 
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More specifically, the Company maintains the Board erred in 
discrediting the testimony of the two Grane representatives—
Beth Lengle and Vivian Andrascik—responsible for the no-
hire decisions.  Because we believe these credibility 
determinations were not patently unreasonable, we decline to 
reverse the Board.   
Both witnesses testified that their no-hire decisions 
were based largely on discussions they had with other Laurel 
Crest employees.  Lengle testified that she decided not to hire 
four of the employees on the basis of negative references she 
received from Rebecca Nelen, Laurel Crest‘s director of 
nursing, during in-depth discussions.  Andrascik testified that 
she declined to hire the fifth employee based largely on 
negative references she received from that employee‘s former 
co-worker, Nancy McMahon. 
The Board determined that these proffered reasons 
were pretextual because the testimony was contradicted by 
other evidence and was not internally consistent.  Nelen, for 
example, had a different recollection of her interactions with 
Lengle.  She testified that she only spoke with Lengle briefly, 
and that she did not recall having any conversations with 
Lengle about individual employees and their job 
performance.  She also testified that because she had only 
been director of nursing for about a year, and had been busy 
with other matters during that time, she had not yet had time 
to get to know the employees by the time the alleged 
conversations were supposed to have taken place.   
                                                                                                     
substantial evidence.  We have reviewed the record and 
consider it sufficient to support the Board‘s inference of 
knowledge.   
20 
 
The Company contends that it was improper for the 
Board to discredit the testimony of Lengle and Andrascik 
because evidence in the record corroborates that testimony.  
The Company points in particular to the fact that some of the 
same criticisms Lengle and Andrascik cited as reasons for not 
hiring the employees were contained in their personnel files.
9
  
According to the Company, because Lengle and Andrascik 
did not review these files prior to making the relevant 
employment decisions, they must have been recounting 
information provided to them by Nelen and McMahon.  This 
corroboration, the Company suggests, undermines fatally the 
Board‘s finding that Lengle‘s and Andrascik‘s testimony was 
not credible. 
That some evidence corroborates a witness‘s testimony 
while other evidence contradicts it, however, does not make 
the Board‘s determination to discredit that testimony patently 
unreasonable.  We are not charged with reweighing the 
evidence in this matter and making an independent 
determination as to whether these witnesses were credible.  
The Board considered this potentially corroborating evidence, 
and decided it was insufficient to render Lengle‘s and 
Andrascik‘s testimony credible.  In particular, the Board 
noted that these witnesses, consistent with the view that the 
                                              
9
 The Company also objects to the discrediting of Lengle‘s 
testimony on the ground that Nelen only said she did not 
recall any meetings, not that they did not occur, and that, 
when pressed, Nelen admitted she may have spoken with 
Lengle.  Witnesses, however, are often reticent to speak in 
absolutes when testifying under oath.  As the Board noted, the 
fact that Nelen took care to correct her testimony to ensure 
she was not perjuring herself hardly requires a finding by the 
Board that her testimony was untrustworthy.   
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no-hire justifications were pretextual, could have consulted 
the personnel files after making the no-hire decisions but 
prior to testifying.  We do not consider this rationale 
unreasonable, and thus do not disturb it.  
*    *   *    *    * 
We summarize our holdings. 
1.  The Board‘s determination that Grane and Cambria 
Care are a single employer, and thus jointly and severally 
liable for violations of the NLRA committed by either of 
them, is supported by substantial evidence. 
2.  The Board acted consistently with the NLRA in 
applying the successorship doctrine to find that the Company 
had a duty to bargain with Local 1305. 
3.  The Board‘s ruling that the Company violated the 
NLRA by refusing to hire five former Laurel Crest employees 
is supported by substantial evidence. 
We, therefore, deny the Company‘s petition for review 
and grant the Board‘s cross-petition for enforcement of its 
decision and order. 
 
 
